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 Rolv Petter Amdam and Ove Bjarnar 
 
Globalization and the Development of Industrial Clusters: Comparing 
Two Norwegian Clusters, 1900–2010 
 
 
This article explores how clusters have reacted to the recent process of 
globalization by comparing the development of two clusters that are located in 
the same region, the county of Møre  og Romsdal in Norway. These two clusters 
are the furniture cluster and the maritime cluster on the west coast of Norway. 
When international competition increased, the first one declined while the other 
prospered and became more global. Structural differences explain only partly 
the different development paths of these clusters. In addition, firms’ strategic 
actions and the degree of collectively shared visions about international 
operations mattered for how the clusters developed.  
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 The development and character of industrial clusters have had a strong impact on the formation 
of modern capitalism worldwide. Since the 1990s, in particular, many local industrial clusters 
have been challenged by globalization and have experienced dramatic changes. Some clusters 
have declined, and others have taken advantage of the new international opportunities and 
continued to grow.1 One example of this is the development of two industrial clusters in the 
same county, Møre og Romsdal, on the west coast of Norway: the maritime cluster, which grew 
from a local cluster to a strong international cluster in the period of globalization from the 1980s 
onward, and the furniture cluster, which disintegrated in the same period (Figure 1). 
 
[Fig. 1 about here] 
 
The area, which has five percent of Norway’s population, emerged as the center of these 
two different industries in Norway during the 1900s. From the 1920s onward, the southern part 
of the county, Sunnmøre, took the position of the most dynamic and most important Norwegian 
district for the industrial production of furniture.2 Since the 1950s, no other region in Norway 
has matched it. During the first part of the twentieth century, moreover, the local shipbuilding 
industry evolved as one of several regional maritime agglomerations in Norway, a development 
closely linked to the expansion of the deep-sea fishing fleet in the same area.3 During the 1970s 
the maritime industry was the dominating and most dynamic regional agglomeration within this 
field in Norway. From this basis of comparable strength and high national importance, the two 
clusters developed differently in the following period. In 2007 the Norwegian maritime industry 
employed 37,000 people in total, and turnover was NOK 105 billion (US$ 20 billion). The 
maritime cluster in the region represented roughly 50 percent of these figures. The furniture 
industry, however, employed only 2,430 in the mid-Norway area, which Møre and Romsdal 
dominated for furniture, and the turnover was approximately NOK 5 billion (US$ 0.9 billion).4 
The unequal development of two clusters in one geographical area makes this an 
interesting case for studying the effect of recent globalization on regional development. 
Generally, business historians have contributed greatly to the understanding of the dynamic 
development of industrial clusters, as shown by historian Jonathan Zeitlin’s chapter in The 
Oxford Handbook of Business History (2008).5 Since 2008 research has added more knowledge 
to the understanding of the creation and growth of clusters by studying topics like the rise of 
the Spanish canned fruit and vegetable clusters, the tourism cluster in Majorca, the role of 
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family firms in the Sheffield cutlery district, and steam power’s impact on the creation of 
German clusters.6 Tomoko Hashino and Takafumi Kurosawa added new knowledge to the 
question of cluster governance by researching the role of Japanese regional trade associations, 
and Montserrat Llonch-Casanovas shows in a study of trademarks in Catalan knitwear the 
usefulness of comparing industrial districts.7  
The question of why clusters have developed differently as they have been integrated 
into the global economy has so far mainly been studied from the perspective of economic 
geography.8 Nevertheless, historian Jonathan Zeitlin argues that historical studies show that 
successful responses to globalization have been based on more formalized collaboration among 
economic actors within clusters, while this element has been much weaker in disintegrating 
clusters.9 Like Zeitlin we will argue here for the usefulness of including contributions from 
economic geography in studies of cluster resilience, and consequently follow up his 
recommendation for a “productive dialogue” between these two streams of literature, which 
business historians Andrew Popp and John Wilson have also alluded to.10 In line with economic 
geography we will argue that individual firms will be heavily affected by processes at a regional 
level, while our institutionally oriented approach implies that firm-based strategies will feed 
back to institutions and structures and eventually decide the outcome of the reaction to 
globalization.   
The comparative analysis is structured as follows.11 In the next section we discuss how 
the contribution of the economic geography and strategy literature can enhance the business 
history analysis of clusters. Then we analyze the formation of the two different clusters in the 
same area, and how they evolved into two central clusters at the national level. The following 
sections focus on how these clusters became part of the global economy from the 1970s onward 
and are followed by concluding remarks. The article is based on archival work supported by 
information from a rich local history literature on these two industries in the region. 
 
Perspectives on Cluster Development 
 
According to Michael Porter, strong clusters are characterized by a demanding and 
competitive environment at the regional level with strong linkages among firms, suppliers, 
customers, and related industries and institutions.12 A combination of competition and 
cooperation, including the sharing of knowledge between firms, is an essential upgrading 
mechanism, and specialized factor conditions (skilled labor, capital, and infrastructure) 
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contribute to the competitiveness of the cluster. In line with this perspective, historian Håkon 
With Andersen has shown that supporting institutions have made a strong contribution to the 
innovation and transformation of the maritime cluster in Møre og Romsdal since the 1970s. 
These supporting institutions (insurance and ship classification societies, brokers, 
consultancies, and research institutions) together with the maritime industry created a maritime 
complex.13 
Another stream of economic geography literature is more concerned with the 
explanation of cluster development over time and through life cycles.14 In this perspective, 
clusters develop over time through different phases such as emergence, growth, sustainment, 
and decline or death.15 The life-cycle literature has searched for general societal laws with a 
biological connotation and has been inspired by evolutionary theories in natural sciences.16 The 
later development of a cluster thus depends on path-dependencies that can be traced back to its 
emergence and growth phases. These path-dependencies create trajectories for further 
development. Clusters can also be “locked in” by socioeconomic conditions that were once 
comparative advantages.17  
Seen from a business history perspective, with its strong tradition of researching the 
behavior of individual and collective actors in processes of change, this life-cycle tradition 
might be considered deterministic and accordingly less relevant. Andrew Popp and John 
Wilson, for example, have claimed that cycle theories tend to be deterministic. Based on their 
studies of the development of English industrial clusters, they argue for a non-deterministic 
life-cycle model that can be applied as a methodological tool and not as a theory. For example, 
lock-ins that once contributed to the creation of the cycle are idiosyncratic, are not given, and 
are thus the results of “choices made and not made.”18  
Recently, several scholars within economic geography and regional studies have 
searched in the same vein for more idiosyncratic explanations to the different development 
tracks of clusters, and these searches should be welcomed as a response to the business 
historians’ request for a “productive dialogue.” For example, Raphaël Suire and Jérôme Vicente 
argue that the reason why some clusters decline and others grow as they enter the period of 
globalization has to do with the fact that some clusters are resilient and some are not. A resilient 
cluster is one that has developed adaptive abilities to resist external shock.19 Fiorenza Belussi 
and Silvia Rita Sedita have studied the development of Italian industrial districts, and shown 
that instead of following standardized life cycles, the different districts followed a multiple 
growth pattern.20 Our article aims to develop this dialogue between business history and 
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economic geography, building on Popp and Wilson’s perspective of life cycles as well as 
exploring Jonathan Zeitlin’s observations that in the period of globalization, the development 
of clusters has been increasingly based on a formalized collaboration among actors.21  
 
The Formation of Two Industrial Clusters 
 
The first part of the twentieth century up to the 1970s was a period of formation and 
development of both the maritime and the furniture clusters in the region. The formation of the 
maritime cluster was closely linked to the development of the region’s shipping and fisheries 
business from the late nineteenth century, which shows the strong vertical links between 
producers and customers.22 Historically, the area had developed a rich tradition for 
shipbuilding, fishery services, and coastal transport. Small yards worked closely with skippers 
and ship owners to satisfy the need for specially designed boats and equipment that were fit to 
operate under different local sea and weather conditions. The dispersed and local ownership of 
ships and yards implied that many fishermen owned shares in their boats together with 
neighbors and relatives.23 
Coastal societies in Norway were reluctant to adopt industrialized fisheries that were 
based on the British models from the late 1800s. The British system was a “steel and steam” 
system, concentrated in larger industrialized cities with a proletarian class of fishermen who 
did not own boats or equipment. Fisheries were based on larger trawlers operating on the deep 
seas in different parts of the world and having little relation to coast-based fisheries. Obviously, 
the Norwegian coastal and seasonal fishery carried out with the “wood and sail” system could 
not be competitive in the long run. However, by introducing small motors that were fitted into 
smaller wooden boats that were modified to operate in different seasonal fisheries, the “wood 
and motor” system evolved as a pillar in a gradual modernization of the fisheries. This 
modernization included the gradual development of larger boats with larger machinery and deck 
technology, which would in the end be suitable for deep sea fishing.24  
New shipyards grew up in the town of Ålesund and Vestnes municipality in the 1860s 
to produce vessels for fishing on the North Sea coasts and even for exploring fishing in Iceland 
and the Faroe Islands. Yards subsequently grew up in Ulsteinvik and other villages before the 
1920s, making clearly visible the trend of a gradual transformation of the fishing fleet in the 
1920s and 1930s.25 In the 1950s and 1960s the region emerged as the leading maritime and 
marine region in Norway, with strong ties among fisheries, related yards, mechanical 
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workshops, and equipment producers.26 Skippers were also owners of deep-sea fishing vessels 
to a larger extent than in any other area of Norway. They continuously experienced the need for 
improvements and conveyed their ideas for innovations to the yards upon their return from the 
various fishing fields. The yards, banks, and other supporting institutions trusted these ideas 
and with the skippers they took substantial financial risks to begin modernizing the fleet. These 
networks knitted diverse actors together in cluster-like relations. Many fishermen worked at the 
yards between seasons, and mechanical workers were employed in fisheries. These shifting 
employment relationships within the system promoted the spread of new ideas and solutions 
from the yards and equipment producers to the fleet deployed in the fishing fields. They laid 
the foundation for the revolution based on steel vessels for deep sea fishing that took place 
during the 1960s and 1970s.27  
The “wood and motor” era came to an end in the 1960s with the breakthrough in steel 
hulls. The transition to steel vessels was accompanied by innovations in electronic instruments 
for detecting fish (sonar/asdic).28 Although the combination of technologies initially led to 
soaring catches and output in the herring sector, the technologies had a distinctly generic 
character and affected all deep sea fishing. The use of new ring nets and power blocks and the 
development of new propulsion systems (side propellers) totally revolutionized the pelagic 
sector in terms of geographical range, catch, and output. The transition to steel hulls catalyzed 
this revolution. In the late 1970s, another breakthrough extending fishing range and flexibility 
was the development of the combined ring net and trawler, made possible through the 
construction of the stern as a lateral axis. 
Returning to the furniture industry, in 1908 the first furniture company opened in 
Sunnmøre, which became a regional center for furniture production in the 1920s.29 Over the 
next three decades it went from a marginal source to become the most important and dynamic 
Norwegian furniture district. This expansion has been interpreted as a reaction to the economic 
crises in Norway in the 1920s and 1930s, and Norwegian historians have used it as an example 
of how entrepreneurs confirm Schumpeter’s theory on creative destruction by creating new 
activities in crisis.30 The establishment of several small-scale production firms was an attempt 
to do something creative in order to avoid unemployment and the other negative consequences 
of the economic crises. The founders were men from the region, many of them sons of small 
farmers of limited means, but the start-ups did not require much financial capital. Very often, 
these men started production in the basements of their own houses with no employees or only 
a few. The success of the furniture industry in the region is explained by two factors. First, 
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factory owners and employees came from the same rural communities, which meant the new 
factories were able to produce furniture at a lower cost, since the price of labor was substantially 
lower than in the cities where most furniture production had traditionally taken place. Second, 
the small factories were innovative, especially in introducing small electro-motors that favored 
small-scale production.  
The accounts of how these two clusters emerged confirm the impression of an 
entrepreneurial and egalitarian culture in the region.31 There were, however, some striking 
differences. While the maritime industry grew as a result of demand from the local fishing fleet, 
and consequently developed strong links with very demanding local customers from the outset, 
these vertical relationships were missing in the furniture industry. The furniture industry had 
no local competitive advantage apart from cheap labor. Suppliers were national or international, 
and customers came from all over the country.  
However, during the 1950s, while production and the number of employees declined in 
the rest of the Norwegian furniture industry, these figures increased in this region.32 New 
companies emerged, developed into a cluster, and contributed to the creation of a more 
demanding competitive environment. These horizontal relationships were also characterized by 
cooperation. For example, in 1956 four of the largest producers joined forces and established a 
joint export organization, Westnofa.33 For domestic distribution, the company Johan Riise 
emerged as a dominating multi-firm distribution agency for most producers in the area. These 
developments strengthened the vertical relationships in the region’s furniture cluster, but the 
impact of demanding local customers and suppliers was still weak compared to the maritime 
industry. 
When we compare the furniture and maritime industries we see that, as early as the 
beginning of the 1950s, the furniture industry in the county had gained a dominating national 
position. According to a study made by the regional authorities in 1954, the furniture industry 
and the textile industry were the most important manufacturing sectors in the area. Of the 1,424 
manufacturing firms in the county, 282 were furniture producers and they accounted for 18 
percent of the manufacturing labor force. Out of 3,212 employees in the region’s furniture 
industry, 914 were employed in Sykkylven and 456 in Stranda. These two municipalities were 
small micro-agglomerations of the furniture industry and employed 75–80 percent of the total 
workforce of the region’s manufacturing industry.34 The local maritime industry did not occupy 
an equally dominating position at the national level, but nevertheless it made a major 
contribution to the growth of the fishing industry. Being the dynamic center for the national 
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fishing industry, with supporting yards and an emerging industry in processing fish to make 
such products as fish oil, as well as having a long tradition in exporting (especially dried cod 
[bacalhau]), the region took a lead position in Norway’s marine activities. As in the furniture 
industry, there were micro-agglomerations of small shipyards, such as the municipality of 
Vestnes, which had around three thousand inhabitants and where the majority of the non-
agricultural population worked in small shipyards.35 
During the 1970s, the maritime cluster in the region also emerged as the dominating 
cluster in Norway, as we will explore in the next section.36 Its growth had also been strong in 
the 1960s, and from 1960 to 1970 the number of employees in the shipbuilding industry grew 
by 121 percent, from 2,088 to 4,537; at the same time employment in the building and 
maintenance of steel vessels grew by 365 percent, from 733 to 3,405.37 Parallel to this 
development of the industrial structure, the establishment of stronger local and regional banks 
and area industry associations significantly expanded the institutional supports.38 
In 1974 about 25 percent of the total industrial workforce in the region worked in the 
maritime industry, and about 14 percent in the furniture industry. In Sykkylven, 75 percent of 
the workforce was employed in the furniture industry, and in Ulsteinvik 93 percent in the 
maritime industry. For both industries, the horizontal links were strong, which is shown by the 
large number of local producers. In 1970 there were 38 shipyards and in 1974 there were 169 
furniture companies.39 The horizontal links were reflected in the way local firms cooperated 
and acted jointly, and not only as individual firms, for example, by establishing regional 
industrial laboratories in cooperation with the Norwegian Productivity Institute (NPI) and the 
semi-governmental technological consulting and training organization, Statens Teknologiske 
Insitutt (STI).40 Regarding developing new technologies for maritime and furniture production 
these networks acted as important supporting institutions in the development of the two clusters.   
 One of the networks’ key activities was to organize seminars and projects on different 
business administration and management topics, including how to improve regional vertical 
integration.41 For example, in the late 1950s, 160 local firms from different industries 
participated in meetings and seminars on how to improve subcontracting within the region.42 
Vertical integration was one cluster-related dimension that revealed striking differences 
between the maritime and furniture industry clusters. The shipbuilding industry had developed 
close links to demanding local customers (in the fishing industry) and local suppliers of diverse 
equipment, including hydraulic winches from Hydraulik Brattvaag and compressors from 
Sperre in the local community of Ellingsøya in the 1940s.43 In comparison the furniture industry 
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had few local subcontractors and suppliers of raw materials were primarily from outside the 
region. 
Finally, both clusters were very innovative. In the maritime industry, several radical 
innovations made a huge impact on all sectors of deep sea fishing, shipyards, and related 
activities during the 1960s.44 Within the white fish sector, the development of automatically 
driven long lines assisted with two of the most demanding operations in terms of the crew 
needed and the workload during fishing: the baiting of the lines and the hauling-up operation. 
The construction of sheltered decks facilitated the use of new forms of sterns and automatic 
hauling. Within the white fish sector, moreover, local entrepreneurs developed a compact 
factory trawler concept. All of these technological solutions represent “conceptual” innovations 
that enjoyed tremendous international success. It is fair to say that although some of these 
technologies imitated or refined ideas generated outside the region, the diffusion of new 
technology within the county was unmatched in any other area. Thus, Møre og Romsdal 
evolved as a significant national maritime center. 
In the furniture industry, this region again was the most productive and innovative in 
Norway in the 1960s and 1970s. The manufacturers were pioneers in introducing standardized 
production methods. They also developed new technology to produce laminated furniture. In 
1971 the company Sandela in Sykkylven introduced technology to form-cast foamed plastic on 
metal frames, which revolutionized the production of stuffed furniture. From the 1950s onward, 
more and more local companies began to cooperate with designers to develop new models of 
furniture. This movement resulted in some successful models on the Norwegian market, like 
Siesta (produced by Vestlandske) and Laminette (produced by Møre Lenestolfabrikk). In 1971 
Ekornes launched the Stressless armchair, a brand that was marketed in Stressless shops in 
several European, Asian, and American countries from the 1990s onward. In 1972, Stokke 
announced its Tripp Trapp highchair—“the chair that grows with the child”—designed by Peter 
Opsvik, a chair that has also had tremendous international success.45 
According to professor of business strategy Julian Birkinshaw, dynamic clusters with 
high innovation activities have tended to respond more positively to globalization than less 
dynamic business clusters.46 From this perspective, both clusters should have been prepared to 
enter the global economy, but, as we will see, the maritime cluster managed better than the 
furniture cluster. 
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Responses to Globalization in the Maritime Cluster 
 
The maritime industry in Møre og Romsdal was substantially transformed during the 
1970s. While in other parts of Norway this industry suffered from the global oil crisis of 1973, 
the local industry was transformed and strengthened as a cluster. The shipyards were relatively 
small and flexible, with local owners, and they could, for example, easily move from producing 
ships to repairing them. More important, however, was their ability to innovate and develop 
new fishing vessels and equipment, as well as respond proactively to the need to construct 
supply ships to serve the new oil and gas fields in the North Sea.47 Offshore supply vessels 
(OSVs) are fairly small boats that are required to operate in very similar conditions as fishing 
vessels, and the local shipyards applied their experience of fishing fleets more or less directly 
to the new OSVs. During this process the linkages to the national technical university Norges 
Tekniske Høgskole (NTH) and its research organization (SINTEF) as supporting institutions 
were strengthened. The family firms’ need for financial capital to expand was met by the merger 
of the local bank, Sunnmørsbanken, with a national bank, Kreditkassen. The climate for 
cooperation improved as many actors realized that there was a need for tighter cooperation to 
counteract downturns in the fisheries and shipbuilding. A formal expression of this was the 
transformation of the regional business association of yards, Vestlandske fartybyggjarlag, into 
an agency for marketing and financing new ships.48 Here we focus on how the actors in the 
cluster increasingly acted jointly in the process of innovation and internationalization as if they 
were following a meta-strategy at cluster level. We argue that, in order to understand the 
dynamic development of clusters, it is not only decisions at the single-firm level that should be 
consulted, but also behavior that represents shared thoughts and visions among the members of 
the cluster. This meta-perspective is inspired by two researchers in regional studies, Marco 
Bellandi and Annalisa Caloffi, who define meta-management as a local governance mechanism 
that formulates shared visions and suggests strategies and actions based on a collective 
diagnosis and taking into account the interests of the actors in the cluster. These visions, 
diagnoses, and strategies may be expressed explicitly or act as hidden norms for action.49  
The local maritime industry had already become involved in international activities in 
the 1950s. Hatløy Verkstad built vessels for the Faroe Islands in the 1950s for line fishing, and 
the company Ulstein built line vessels and ring net trawlers for Iceland in the 1960s.50 Another 
key company, Hydraulik Brattvaag, produced hydraulic winches at a unit in Spain from 1971 
onward.51 In other words, some actors already had international experience when the industry 
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was challenged by crisis in 1973.  An expression of meta-management in this period was a 
business trip that several small yards and suppliers organized to the Faroe Island in the early 
1970s to promote export.52  
From the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, the demand for new fishing vessels declined 
substantially, which affected the entire cluster, shipbuilding as well as equipment producers.53 
The fisheries were heavily exposed to the reduction in the number of species and to national 
and international regulations to counteract overfishing. However, new fisheries were 
established, and the state policies launched to cope with this crisis stimulated a renewal of the 
fishing fleet. In the dawn of globalization, the maritime complex in the region began to become 
international in response to the challenges. One of the earliest internationalization processes in 
terms of foreign direct investment (FDI) took place in the late 1970s, when Sjøvik, one of the 
fishing companies in Romsdal, established a subsidiary in Grimsby, U.K., which distributed 
frozen fillets from the company’s factory trawlers to the European market. The same company 
extended its foreign operations in the mid-1980s. By building a new factory trawler, they took 
on a risky shell-fishing operation in the Barents Sea. The fishery collapsed, however, and a very 
innovative move was launched, establishing new shell-fishing methods in Canada. This 
operation turned out to be a success, owing to the export of regional know-how and reverse 
knowledge transfer from foreign operations, which had long-term effects.  
Drawing on local knowledge as well as international experience Sjøvik widened its 
global operations. The internationalization of the ship design segment in the cluster furthered 
this expansion. Based on a regional design, sold by some of the ship design consultants within 
the cluster, a substantial number of modern fishing vessels were built for companies in East 
Germany and Russia. The companies lacked the competence to run the fleet, however, and 
Sjøvik operated the fleet from the local headquarters in Romsdal, drawing on its experience 
operating in various international fisheries including in Argentina and Canada.54 
 A diminishing cod population and national regulations imposed on cod fishing from the 
mid-1970s hindered the factory trawler companies’ efforts to modernize the fleet and build new 
vessels. However, optimistic forecasts for future cod fishing as well as relaxed regulations led 
to a substantial renewal of the fleet in the mid-1980s. The forecasts were wrong, and from the 
late 1980s the modernized fleet of factory trawlers was forced to explore global fisheries.  By 
1990 40 percent of this fleet operated in areas like the Falkland Islands, Oman, Argentina, New 
Zealand, Australia, South Africa, and Canada. This global move was strongly supported 
financially by the regional office of the bank Kreditkassen in Ålesund.  In general actors who 
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internationalized their activity could lean on the cluster infrastructure, not least the 
strengthening of regional financial institutions through bank mergers and the creation of a new 
bank, Sunnmørsbanken, in 1975.55 
 The regional concept of designing smaller, compact factory trawlers emerged, as 
mentioned above, as a key factor in the cluster’s success. The ship design consultants 
established a profitable market for this concept, and in fact from 1983 until 1992, 85 factory 
trawlers were built for companies in the U.S.S.R., Canada, the United States, the European 
Union, and other countries, based on the regional design. From 1985 to 1990, almost 100 
percent of the regional capacity for shipbuilding was engaged in building factory trawlers. 
Despite the crises, by the mid-1980s Møre og Romsdal had become Norway’s leading 
shipbuilding center. Regional entrepreneurs established operations in the United States, and 
even constructed a new American fleet for crab fishing. The regional shipyards were also 
heavily involved in this construction.56       
Thus, there was a distinct pattern, in this early phase of internationalization, of 
entrepreneurial decisions materializing within a wider cluster framework of supporting 
institutions. Moreover, the well-developed and complete cluster structure and diverse 
mechanisms for innovation, cooperation, and competition led to the upgrading of the entire 
cluster. International knowledge transfer played a vital part in this upgrading. The entrepreneurs 
engaged regional resources in this internationalization because they had a developmental 
perspective. Developments within the new OSV segment further strengthened this trend. 
Although some vital technological steps emanated from more top-down vertical relations, the 
horizontal networks within the regional geographical scope were, in general, more important, 
and were essential in order to take advantage of global opportunities. For example, at the end 
of the 1980s, when oil wells were found in Brazilian territory, in very deep water, some shipping 
companies in the cluster saw the opportunity to build vessels for these operations.57  
The offshore networks that largely formed the OSV segment in the region were, from 
the outset, international. The local networking was paramount, insofar as shipowners built their 
first OSVs using knowledge transferred from deep sea fishing and expertise in building vessels 
for this sector, which meant that there was both knowledge-based and production-based 
capacity in the region for beginning petroleum-related activity. Moreover, some of the design 
companies transferred vital knowledge into the local networks through their international 
operations. Through this process the shipyards developed new knowledge that was essential for 
local innovative projects.58 This was an important move for the cluster’s development, as 
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otherwise many of the larger shipping companies in this phase would have ordered vessels 
overseas.  
However, the offshore vessel sector was struck by heavy crises in the early 1980s that 
peaked in 1983 and 1986. In 2002 the shipyards experienced a serious new crisis stemming 
from an overly strong Norwegian currency, accompanied by wage increases and a reduced 
regime of state support. They declined in competitiveness and lost market share to shipyards in 
Asia and Eastern Europe. Employment fell from 5,500 to 3,800 in 2002. As in the 1970s, this 
crisis also led to a renewal and to a deeper involvement in the global economy for the maritime 
cluster. The shipyards in the cluster restored their competitiveness through substantial 
investment in modern production facilities, updated technology, upgraded competencies, and 
stronger and wider market networks, as well as intensified cooperation within the cluster. 
Norwegian shipyards captured new markets and market share. In 2010 there were thirty 
offshore OSV companies and a world-leading community of ship design consultants who 
brought many international contracts to Norwegian shipyards. 
In general, the soaring demand from Asia for the building of ships and offshore vessels 
led to a growing demand for Norwegian shipbuilding from around 2000. In particular, industrial 
growth in China created a fast-growing demand for ships and for equipment for offshore 
petroleum-related activities. In 2004, the world fleet of supply service vessels amounted to 
approximately 2,000 ships, 270 of them operated by Norwegian companies that mostly 
belonged to the cluster. From 2004 to 2006, twenty five Norwegian shipping companies 
contracted to build such vessels for a sum of NOK 41 billion (US$ 6 billion), and 56 percent of 
these new orders were granted to companies in the cluster. In 2004, more than 50 percent of the 
new ships for which contracts were signed across the world were ordered by Norwegian 
shipping companies.59 
Offshore shipowners in the cluster doubled their revenues from 2002 to 2006, with the 
earnings almost exclusively coming from markets outside the North Sea.60 The growing 
international demand for OSVs was met by transforming several local companies to 
multinational enterprises (MNEs). High labor costs made it difficult to maintain production 
capacity in Norway, and most of the production of hulls was outsourced to eastern European 
transition economies, like Poland and Romania, from the late 1990s. Some firms, like Ulstein, 
based their production offshore by using strategic partners in countries like China, Brazil, and 
Spain. Others like STX established subsidiaries in, for instance, Romania, France, Ukraine, and 
Vietnam.  
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From the 1970s to 2010 the maritime cluster was transformed from a local cluster 
serving the fishing industry to the most international business environment in Norway. For 
example, among Norway’s nineteen counties none exported as much per capita as Møre og 
Romsdal did in 2011.61 A survey shows that in the Shanghai region in 2011 there were sixteen 
subsidiaries of Norwegian firms that had their headquarters or a strong presence in Møre og 
Romsdal.62 While the internationalization of the local yards was originally motivated by cost, 
the motives have become more complex. The industry wanted to be located in global hubs like 
Shanghai and Rio de Janeiro, and there was a strong element of meta-management in the 
decisions to enter these two locations. One CEO said about the local investments in Brazil from 
the 1990s: “A vision or idea was developed horizontally among shipping companies, shipyards 
and equipment producers.”63 Companies also searched for core competencies, which was the 
motive behind Ulstein’s acquisition of Sea Solution of the Netherlands in 2008.64 The 
international MNEs that entered the cluster by acquisition were also seeking competencies. 
Global actors such as Rolls Royce, Aries, Trieste, Bourbon, ABB, and STX became major 
players within the cluster from around 2000, and they acted as institutional players, supporting 
research and development and competence building in the region.65  
 
Responses to Globalization in the Furniture Cluster 
 
While the maritime industry experienced a radical shift in the international competitive 
environment in the 1970s, the furniture industry had already been gradually exposed to 
international competition from the end of the 1950s. In 1953 the value of imported furniture 
was only one percent of the value of total production in Norway. The value of exports was just 
half of one percent. In 1960 the value of imports was still only 1.5 percent, but from the mid-
1960s this figure began to increase substantially, from 3.5 percent in 1965 to 16 percent in 
1970.66   
Challenges were met by a proactive approach. The new competition was foreseen before 
Norway became a member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960. The 
furniture industry was more positive about the possibilities of reaching new markets than other 
industries that produced for the domestic market.67 Even in the 1950s several important 
decisions and actions that expressed elements of an internationalization strategy were taken at 
the cluster—and not at the firm—level; for example, in the establishment of Westnofa in 1956. 
Most importantly, the producers joined forces to go abroad and search for new knowledge. In 
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1966 a group of more than ten furniture producers from the region, including Ekornes, the 
largest, went to the United States on a study tour to obtain new knowledge and to meet foreign 
competitors.68 
Two companies in the cluster also became small MNEs in this period by establishing 
production units abroad; these were Stokke in Spain in 1972 and Slettvold in Malaysia in 
1977.69 The main international strategy of the cluster firms was, however, to continue their joint 
efforts from the 1950s to promote exports. More and more the cluster served as a unit for 
important strategic actions taken to globalize. The efforts to increase exports only partly paid 
off. From 1970 to 1975 exports doubled in value, from NOK 121 million to NOK 219 million. 
However, imports more than tripled, from NOK 164 million to NOK 527 million.70 The 
industry increasingly feared that it would be lagging behind its competitors in Sweden, 
Denmark, Germany, France, and Spain, meeting the same external pressures that had largely 
destroyed the textile industry in the region. Many feared that eastern European countries might 
also develop into new competitors.71 Even in the domestic and regional market, Danish and 
Swedish firms captured a steadily growing share. A local branch of the national furniture 
industry association, Møbelprodusentenes Landsforening, and the STI took on the task of 
investigating the apparently competitive advantage of the Swedish and Danish producers 
abroad and in the Norwegian market. A project group consisting of representatives from 
businesses, the STI, the NPI, labor unions, and county authorities was formed with the aim of 
seeking new knowledge in different European countries to prepare for the anticipated crisis. 
The senior officer at the STI, Peder Myrstad, was the leader of the group, which actually split 
into several project groups supported by the governmental financial institutions Distriktenes 
Utbyggingsfond and Industrifondet. 
The project group made several study trips, first to Scandinavian corporations, and then 
to Germany, France, and Spain.72 The group tapped diplomatic channels to get access to the 
leading companies. The visit to German companies, which had to be upgraded to an official 
bilateral meeting between industry attachés from Germany and Norway in order to take place, 
demonstrated, in particular, that Norwegian companies lagged behind technologically, 
especially in the application of computerized laser technology in the production process. This 
technology allowed great savings in material costs, labor costs, and throughput, in addition to 
raising quality. This impression was confirmed by visits to the French multinational corporation 
Lectra, the leading producer of this technology, and the Sunnmøre furniture companies realized 
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that they were compelled to invest in it. However, none of them had anything near the financial 
capacity to introduce this new technology to the region.  
The modernization process thus rested heavily on the cluster level and on a cluster-
oriented corporate strategy, as shown by the following process: Through a cooperative venture, 
ten producers established a common laser-based production unit in the regional center of the 
furniture industry, Sykkylven. Moreover, Lectra moved its Scandinavian head office to 
Sykkylven to reap the benefits of the cluster’s ability to facilitate knowledge flow and the 
dissemination of technology. The cooperative venture and the establishment of Lectra in the 
cluster in 1984 marked the start of a project lasting from 1984 to 1987, called Møbeldata. 
Through this project, Lectra’s technology was refined and adapted to the local production 
facilities. After a few years the new technology was adopted and more widely diffused in the 
region, and the local producers far outperformed their foreign competitors in the local market 
and advanced in international markets.73 In these years, production increased, as well as the 
importance of exports. While the value of exports was 14 percent of total production in 1980, 
it rose to 18 percent in 1984 and 22 percent in 1989.74 All the major producers, including 
Ekornes, had to cooperate to get access to the new technology; it would have been too risky and 
too expensive for firms to invest in the computer-based technology on their own. Thus, it is fair 
to say that it was the cluster that reacted to the growing external pressure, and not the individual 
companies. 
The firms in the furniture cluster met the international challenges of the 1970s by 
collectively searching abroad for new technology to adopt to increase exports. While the 
cluster’s key firms had reacted collectively to both emerging global competition in the 1960s 
and new technological and market challenges in the 1970s and 1980s, that was not the case 
when global competition increased during the 1990s. Instead of firms reacting jointly, two 
different internationalization strategies crystallized: one was to send production offshore to 
low-cost countries; the other was to improve exports by introducing advanced robots to save 
labor costs.  
Five firms chose the strategy of sending production offshore in the late 1990s, investing 
in Thailand, Estonia, and Lithuania.75 Tougher international competition led these firms to set 
up factories offshore, as illustrated by some figures on how the Norwegian furniture industry 
became more integrated into the global economy. The value of furniture imports increased from 
NOK 2 billion in 1989 to NOK 6 billion in 2000; the value of exports increased from NOK 0.6 
billion to NOK 2.9 billion in the same period. If we take the investments in Lithuania as an 
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example, it is clear that the main motive for this was cost reduction, since Lithuanian workers’ 
wages were 15 to 20 percent of wages in Norway. Structural similarities between the Norwegian 
and the Lithuanian furniture regions suggest that the subsidiaries had the potential to use 
Lithuania as a new source of knowledge. But in practice, the subsidiaries copied the routines of 
the Norwegian production system: “The furniture producer has established a copy of the factory 
in Norway,” a newspaper wrote of one company.76 The subsidiaries not only copied production 
but also the idea of agglomeration. Four subsidiaries from the cluster started production in the 
same industrial park in Lithuania, which was therefore known as “Little Sunnmøre.” 
This case tells us two things. The first is how strategy changed in a period of strong 
external pressure, from searching abroad for new knowledge to searching abroad for lower 
production costs. The second is how strategic actions shifted from the cluster level to the 
corporate level. According to the national association of the furniture industry, firms cooperated 
less within the cluster, and it said in a report in 2003 that “the activities within the different 
regional groups of producers has [sic] decreased over the last years.”77 While Hjellegjerde and 
some other companies chose the international strategy of offshoring production and partly 
closing down production in Norway, the largest actor, Ekornes, decided to strengthen its 
presence in Norway and sell its foreign subsidiaries. In 1984 and 1985 Ekornes had transformed 
to an MNE by acquiring one Swedish and one German producer, but it discovered after a few 
years that it could not manage to develop its organization into a successful MNE. The foreign 
units were sold, and from 1994 all production units were in Norway.78 The new international 
strategy was one of growth through exports, based on highly robotized production to save labor 
costs. These contradictory strategies reflected the breakdown of the cluster as a unit for strategic 
action. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The two industrial clusters emerged in the same region and in the same period at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. When international competition increased in the 1960s and 
1970s, they were both dynamic and proactive, but when the depth and speed of globalization 
changed in the 1980s, they reacted differently. The furniture cluster declined while the maritime 
cluster developed from a dynamic regional cluster to one strongly embedded in the global 
maritime offshore vessel industry. 
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Both clusters were originally innovative and open to change. The horizontal links 
between producers of ships and furniture were strong and were characterized by both 
competition and cooperation, which was expressed in joint initiatives and knowledge sharing 
within a relatively small geographical region. There were also, however, structural factors that 
were different. From the very beginning, the furniture industry had much weaker vertical ties 
to both suppliers and customers. The emergence of the furniture cluster was built on cheap and 
skilled labor as the most important specialized factor, not on the existence of local suppliers or 
raw material. The customers were consumers from all over the country, and the regional 
furniture industry had, with some exceptions, limited control over the distribution system. 
Even in its formative period the maritime cluster appeared to be a more complete cluster. 
In the local maritime complex, local suppliers of equipment, yards, fishermen who demand high 
quality vessels, and supporting institutions were tightly interwoven, as has been shown by the 
historian Håkon With Andersen.79 Because of the strong vertical relationships in the maritime 
cluster, demanding customers served as the main driver for internationalization. The customers, 
especially the deep-sea fishing fleet and later the offshore companies, always functioned as 
drivers of modernization. When customers became international, the maritime industry 
followed. This process was strengthened by the emergence of new markets, especially in Asia, 
and by foreign MNEs investing in the region to get access to local competencies. The driver for 
the internationalization of the furniture industry, however, was the need for cost savings. The 
export of furniture increased gradually from the 1960s onward, but the industry lacked a strong 
united group of demanding customers. When the industry spread internationally by establishing 
production abroad around 2000, the geographical localization (Lithuania, Estonia, and 
Thailand) was decoupled from the market (Scandinavia, Germany, and the United States).  
We could say that there were structural features characterizing the two clusters that 
support the argument from the economic geography tradition that endogenous institutional 
factors dating back to the emergence of the clusters created a situation of lock-in that strongly 
influenced the development of their life cycles at a later time.80 However, there are also factors 
affecting these two clusters that show a much more dynamic and unpredictable development 
track. One observation in this respect concerns the development of supporting institutions. In 
the 1950s and 1960s, both the local furniture industry and the maritime complex were part of a 
regional network that was unique in Norway for developing an informal and flexible regional 
system of testing, consultancy, and training.81 From the 1970s the maritime cluster became 
much more strongly involved in research and innovation networks, especially with the technical 
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university in Trondheim (NTNU) and the SINTEF research center, as well as the global 
classification society for ships, DnV.82 In 2010 the local maritime industry financed five 
professors at the local Ålesund University College, where several MSc programs in marine and 
maritime disciplines were offered. In 2013 the local cluster organization, the National Center 
of Excellence, Maritime, was one of two (out of twelve) cluster organizations in Norway that 
were upgraded to a Global Center of Excellence.83 The furniture industry had no such center 
and struggled from the 1990s onward to offer one class for the furniture industry at high school 
level. 
Another observation is that the development of these two clusters was also affected by 
decisions taken by firms, both as single units and jointly as expressions of shared visions and 
objectives within the clusters. Referring to Jonathan Zeitlin’s request for a productive dialogue 
between business history and economic geography on industrial clusters, one contribution of 
our article is to show how both the single firm unit and a formal cooperative organization are 
too limited to give an understanding of how clusters have responded to globalization. Recently, 
some scholars within the economic geography tradition have argued for the need to expand 
from focusing on endogenous structural phenomena to include firms’ behavior and strategy 
when explaining why some clusters fail and others do not. Belussi and Sedita mention 
differences in firms’ strategies as a reason for multiple path-dependency differences among 
comparable clusters.84 Aitziber Elola and colleagues talk about differences in strategic 
capabilities among firms.85 We, however, argue that the strategies and behaviors of firms in a 
cluster should be studied not only at firm level, but also at cluster level. In both clusters we see 
several examples of key decisions that transcended the firm level. When meeting endogenous 
challenges, firms in the clusters acted jointly, and these actions were primarily the result of 
informal dialogues more than decisions in formal organizations.  
We can observe a high degree of meta-management when important strategic decisions 
and actions express the interests and shared thoughts and visions of most actors in a cluster 
rather than one single firm.86 We have seen several expressions of meta-management within 
both industries. When the maritime industry cluster really became involved in the global 
economy around 2000, the key actors in the cluster all acted in the same way in transforming 
themselves into firms with a strong international presence. In the furniture industry cluster, 
however, radical changes occurred. The difference in internationalization strategy around 2000 
between the largest furniture producer, Ekornes (which chose to export), and some of the other 
firms (which chose to move production offshore), shows that the tradition of taking core 
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decisions informally at cluster level was replaced by corporate-based management in the 
furniture industry. In our case these differences help explain the different reactions of the two 
clusters to globalization.  
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